The addition of DIY drone-jammer onto their vehicles by the Russians has been observed. In response, the Ukrainians have resorted to countering this by utilizing drones to blow up these jammers.

The fear of Ukrainian drones among Russian marines is justified. All Russian troops are making every effort to intercept, disable and repel these small drones that are loaded with explosives.

Although improvisation can be effective, it is not always successful. It has been observed that Russian troops are attaching RP-377 radio-jammers, which are intended to disrupt the signals that activate radio-triggered improvised explosive devices, to their tanks and combat vehicles in an attempt to interfere with the signals that operate fast first-person-view drones.

The inefficiency of RP-377 against FPV drones is becoming more evident. Social media is flooded with darkly-ironic videos that show Ukrainian drones destroying Russian vehicles equipped with homemade drone-jammers.

Thematically, the videos bear resemblance to those portraying Ukrainian forces demolishing Russian GPS-jammers using GPS-guided bombs, as you might have anticipated.

The Russians’ drone predicament is exemplified by an awkward T-80BVM tank from either the 155th Brigade or 40th Brigade of the Russian naval infantry, which features homemade cage armor that may impede the turret’s movement but could provide some defense against detonating drones.

The tank’s rearmost cage armor is adorned with the peculiar RP-377 radio-jammer. Developed by the Kremlin, this portable jammer serves the purpose of disrupting enemy communications and safeguarding infantry and vehicles against improvised explosive devices.

Russia’s irregular warfare campaigns, notably in Syria, are greatly plagued by the issue of IEDs. Conversely, in Ukraine, where the primary combatants are regular forces, the prevalence of these explosive devices is relatively diminished.

The presence of RP-377s on the hulls of Russian vehicles on the Ukraine front line is becoming increasingly common. It is unlikely that these jammers are intended to counter IEDs. It seems that the Russians are relying on the RP-377s to neutralize drones.

Principle dictates that both a remote IED and a drone are equally susceptible to radio-jamming. In 2020, after conducting tests, the Russian troops stationed in the Eastern Military District asserted that their RP-377s effectively aided in suppressing unmanned aerial vehicles.

Indeed, numerous drones feature frequency-hopping controls or autopilots that effectively counteract the impact of radio-jamming. Consequently, there have been numerous instances of successful drone strikes on vehicles equipped with additional RP-377s.

It is worth noting that a Ukrainian FPV drone collided with a Russian BMP fighting vehicle equipped with an RP-377 a few weeks ago, which is quite ironic.

The utilization of drones on a daily basis is experiencing a significant surge in the United States, encompassing a wide range of applications such as infrastructure inspection and package delivery. Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) holds authority over the airspace, it is crucial for cities to comprehend the expanding industry that will eventually operate within their communities. By doing so, they can effectively equip themselves to harness the advantages for their citizens while safeguarding against any potential challenges that may emerge.

The Growing Drone Economy in America and the Role of Cities

Drones are proving to be a game-changer for American cities, with their widespread use expected to bring about positive impacts on various aspects of society, such as the environment and the economy. Many cities have already witnessed a surge in drone jammer usage for a range of purposes, including public safety, medical deliveries, retail package delivery, and infrastructure inspection. By accelerating the development of drone infrastructure, cities can modernize faster and reduce the load on traditional infrastructure while integrating this emerging technology into the skies.

NLC’s report on Cities and Drones highlights the role of cities in the evolving drone industry. According to the report, city governments can still regulate drones despite the FAA’s final rule. Instead of imposing a ban, officials should explore the potential benefits of this technology for residents and city services.

Airspace Link has collaborated with federal, state, and local governments, drone operators, and industry experts to develop a plan for cities to participate in the drone signal jammers economy, ensuring the safety and security of residents while maximizing benefits for the community.

Examining the Long-Term Worth, Analyzing the Figures in Detail.

The complete realization of the long-awaited potential of drones in advancing economic, environmental, and societal goals can only be achieved through comprehensive scaling of operations. To enable widespread drone operations, it is imperative for all stakeholders, including cities, to make a dedicated commitment towards establishing the necessary infrastructure and regulations.

Safeguard Your Privacy against Unwanted Drone Surveillance.

The use of drones can potentially lead to privacy violations as they have the ability to intrude into people’s personal space and collect personal data without their consent, which can inadvertently compromise their privacy. Moreover, the constant recording of video footage during flight can result in the collection of information about individuals without any legitimate reason, thereby violating their privacy rights.

The use of unmanned aircraft by anti-regime groups to target military forces is becoming increasingly prevalent.

Rebel groups and drone operation groups have stated that resistance fighters in Myanmar are now turning to drones as a crucial tool in their attacks against Myanmar military forces. This shift in strategy comes after successfully overcoming the junta’s anti-drone jammers, allowing them to effectively utilize this technology in their fight for freedom.

Ko Nyein, the leader of Cloud Wings, a rebel drone force in Kayin state, eastern Myanmar, has reported a significant improvement in the performance of their drones.

He mentioned that their drones are now capable of carrying increased payloads, achieving higher altitudes and longer distances, and effectively countering the junta’s signal jammers. Moreover, he emphasized the wide range of military applications their drones can now serve across different columns in Myanmar.

In 2022, rebel forces carried out approximately 642 drone attacks targeting junta soldiers, as reported by three separate drone forces operating in Kayin and Kayah states, as well as Sagaing and Magway regions.

The National Unity Government has reported an increase in the use of drones this year, as stated by militia groups operating under their influence. However, due to security concerns and the sensitivity surrounding military affairs, they were unable to provide specific details.

As of now, none of the groups have released any statistics regarding the number of drone attacks that have taken place this year.

Drone operators have reported that the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and ethnic militias, comprised of regular citizens, are utilizing advanced warfare technology to confront the military forces that seized power in the 2021 coup. In response to the junta soldiers’ deployment of machine guns and anti-drone defense equipment at strategic military bases, the PDFs and ethnic militias have adapted by employing modern-day drone technology.

Initially, the insurgent combatants depended on artisanal armaments, such as tumees, hunting rifles, launchers, and bombs, to confront the forces of the national military.

According to PDF personnel, the utilization of a greater number of attack drones capable of deploying bombs has increased since the successful defeat of the junta’s anti-drone defense system.

According to Maung Maung Swe, the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the National Unity Government, a group of former civilian leaders and anti-junta activists has provided over 400 attack drones to various loosely controlled militia groups.

The RFA was informed that the weaknesses and strengths of the junta’s drones are well-known to us, and we can now effectively neutralize them. Our knowledge of the wifi jammers‘ frequency has made it easy for us to infiltrate them throughout the country.

Cost of bombs

Ko Nyein reported that the Cloud Wings drone force, established in Kayin state in March, has successfully carried out over 100 drone operations against the junta.

Ko Nyein highlighted that the exorbitant expenses associated with the different bombs affixed to the drones have posed a significant obstacle.

He stated that the primary challenge we encounter revolves around the expense associated with the bombs.

The police station and municipal hall in the city of Kyainseigyi were targeted by the Cloud Wings drone unit on two separate occasions, September 1 and During these attacks, a total of 107-mm bombs were dropped.

The following day, the police station in Kayin’s Myawaddy city was targeted by the Federal Wings, a separate resistance faction employing drones to launch attacks on the junta’s troops and installations. This act resulted in the loss of five lives, including the district administrator of Myawaddy and the acting commander of the junta’s Light Infantry Regiment No. 175. Additionally, an undisclosed number of individuals sustained injuries during the incident.

Capt. Kaung Thu Win, a member of the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement, expressed concern over the increasingly strategic nature of these drone attacks, which pose a threat to the junta.

The speaker stated that in previous times, military personnel were frightened by landmine assaults during their missions. However, presently, the most intimidating weapons for them are drones, which can be utilized for both defensive and unexpected attacks at any time of the day or night.

He further stated that the military troops were considerably impacted by the bombs released from our drones, although they are incapable of completely eliminating an entire enemy unit.

Attack from a distance

According to Kaung Thu Win, the Drone Guard equipment used by the junta to counter drones is inadequate and several soldiers stationed at bases are not proficient in operating it.

The Civilian Defense and Security Organization of Myaung, a resistance group, launched an attack on junta troops stationed near Sagaing region’s Nat Yay Kan village in Chaung-U township on Sept. 1Utilizing fixed-wing drones, they managed to bypass the military jammers, which are designed to disrupt radio waves and hinder drone control.

DOD looking to buy a batch of counter-drone weapons for international partners

U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command is conducting market research ahead of an anticipated purchase of up to 100 handheld drone jammers.

US Army Looking for Anti-Drone Signal Jammers Solution

The U.S. Army’s Aviation and Missile Command is seeking potential sources of portable drone anti-tracking jammer that can interfere with control, video and navigation signals within a range of at least 5 km.

DefenseScoop has revealed that the Department of Defense is supplying air defense technology to Ukraine and Israel, while the AMC’s Integrated Fires Rapid Capabilities Office-International plans to deliver a maximum of 100 handheld SkyWiper EDM4S devices to undisclosed U.S. allies.

To meet the requirements stated in the information request, the equipment must weigh less than 16 lb and possess the ability to activate electronic warfare capabilities through the trigger. Additionally, the device must have a minimum of six radio frequency modules, which should include 2.4GHz, 2xGNSS 1.5GHz and 1.2GHz, and 5.8GHz, as well as two custom frequency modules that cannot be altered by users. The Army has also mandated the use of high-gain directional antennas for accuracy and efficiency, along with a sturdy frame.

NT Service UAB of Lithuania is presently manufacturing the EDM4S Skywiper systems, which are marketed as an efficient anti-drone solution that can be operated by a single individual with ease.

The move is a direct response to the escalating use of unmanned aerial systems in various battlefields around the world, posing a threat to both U.S. military forces and their international partners.

The purpose of these homemade devices was to jam the signals from kamikaze drones, but the radio transmissions protecting the tanks could also reveal the tank’s location.

Russia’s Lancet kamikaze drones, designed to locate targets and then crash, have become a serious problem for the Ukrainian military.

Drones buzz over the battlefield, flown by pilots on the ground and guided by radio signals.

Jammers mounted on tanks or other vehicles can interfere with the signal and cause the drone to miss its target.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has intensified the drone arms race, with both sides using increasingly sophisticated drones for a variety of missions. The latest salvo is a repeating jammer that forms an invisible protective dome over the tank and jams the signals of any kamikaze drones trying to attack it.

Kamikaze Drone

The Lancet was made by Kalashnikov…yes, that Kalashnikov

One of the most dangerous types of drones on the Ukrainian battlefield is the kamikaze drone, which is designed for one-way flight and is launched over the battlefield. The pilot sits on the ground at the control station and must rely on the drone’s camera to locate the target. When he does so, he flies a drone to attack the target and detonates explosives and sometimes anti-tank charges.

Russian “Lancet” drones pose a serious threat to Ukrainian troops searching for tank and artillery targets in the open air. The new signal jammers, first reported by Ukrainian defense blog Militarnyi, is a radio device operating in the 900 MHz band and transmitting 50 watts of power. When a kamikaze drone falls from the sky in a suicide attempt, the jammer interrupts the signal, causing the drone operator to lose control and miss.

The explosives carried by the Lancet drone can penetrate 200 millimeters of armor; this is enough to penetrate the thin upper armor of many tanks and even the turret. Most Ukrainian tanks have reactive armor tiles on their roofs designed to weaken the plasma jet of shaped charges, but Ukrainian artillery has no such protection. As a result, there are multiple videos on social media showing the Lancet targeting Ukrainian field artillery.

Jammer in Box

Without jammers, Ukrainian tanks can only hide under camouflage nets. Tree cover also prevents kamikaze drone operators from noticing tanks and other equipment

The cell phone jammer is mounted on top of the tank’s turret, behind the commander’s hatch at the highest point of the tank. The electronic equipment is encased in a waterproof casing and then enclosed in a sealed metal box to protect it from enemy fire. The antenna sticks out of the box and sends an interfering signal.

It’s unclear whether the gps jammer runs on batteries or is connected to the tank itself, but the 50-watt power consumption and the fact that the box is just centimeters from the open tank hatch suggests that cables from the tank’s electrical system are exiting. Although this requires the hatch to be open while the jammer is firing, the crew will mostly use it when the tank is stationary. Ukrainian tanks keep their hatches closed under their armor during combat, and moving tanks are generally harder to hit.

The 900 MHz band the jammer emits is a common band used by long-range civilian drones. It is also the same wavelength that the Lancet drone operates on. It is understood that the Russian military also uses civilian drones as reconnaissance systems and purchases them in large quantities on the global market.

Wireless jammers have some disadvantages. The 900 MHz band is also commonly used for voice communications, so all vehicle transmissions must use a different band or else be cut off by other devices. This can result in a loss of combat coordination between jammer-equipped vehicles. The signal can also interfere with friendly drones and reduce troops’ situational awareness.

Another problem is that the drone jammer itself emits a 50-watt radio signal announcing the presence of the tank to anyone capable of listening. If an enemy force could detect and locate jammers, it could actually count the number of tanks and other combat vehicles deploying jammers and learn their locations.

Despite these disadvantages, using a disruptor is better than blasting from above with shaped charges. But the advent of radio-controlled drones means military commanders now have to know when to mask and reveal their electromagnetic signatures. Has the enemy turned on their own jammers? If so, they may not be using drones, but they may be moving and preparing to attack.